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Resum del TFG 
[ENG] This paper covers some of the most important key points to take a deeper insight into the 
geopolitical initiative known in chinese as "一带一路 [yídài yílù]" translated as "Belt & Road initiative" 
(BRI). The Belt refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), an economic cooperation area including  
China and  West Asia and European countries. The term Road refers also to the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR). The BRI is not only important for trade and regional connectivity, but also for understanding  
the dynamics of  the new Multi-polar world currently emerging. Up until now, the world dynamics have 
been long dominated by Western powers. China has beneficiated of the peaceful environment and the U.S. 
hegemony in the world for its own economy growth. Even so, recent events such as the 2008 crisis and the 
election of President Trump, and its consequent withdrawal from world politics had been a turning point 
in global governance. The “Belt and Road” can be regarded as a China’s response to this weak recovery of 
the global economy and the and represents China's demand for inclusive globalization as a contribution to 
global economic governance. Focusing on a particular case, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 
We will see the difficulty involved in a project of these dimensions, as well as the different actors involved, 
both in critical and in cooperation. 
[ESP] Este documento cubre algunos de los puntos clave más importantes para profundizar en la iniciativa 
geopolítica conocida en chino como "一带 一路 [yídài yílù]", traducida como "Iniciativa del Cinturón y la 
Ruta de la Seda" abreviada como Nueva Ruta de la Seda (NRS). El Cinturón se refiere a la principal ruta 
terrestre (en inglés SREB), un área de cooperación económica que incluye a China, Asia occidental y los 
países europeos. El término Ruta se refiere también a la ruta marítima (MSR). El NSR no solo es importante 
para el comercio y la conectividad regional, sino también para comprender la dinámica del nuevo mundo 
multipolar que está surgiendo actualmente. Hasta ahora, la dinámica mundial ha estado dominada 
durante mucho tiempo por los poderes occidentales. China se ha beneficiado del entorno pacífico y la 
hegemonía de los Estados Unidos en el mundo para su propio crecimiento económico. Aun así, los 
acontecimientos recientes como la crisis de 2008 y la elección del presidente Trump, y su consecuente 
retirada de la política mundial han marcado un punto de inflexión en la gobernanza global. La Nueva Ruta 
de la Seda puede considerarse como la respuesta de China a esta débil recuperación de la economía global 
y la demanda de una mayor globalización inclusiva como una contribución a la gobernanza económica 
mundial. Centrándonos en un caso particular, el Corredor Económico China-Pakistán (CPEC), veremos la 
dificultad involucrada en un proyecto de estas dimensiones, así como los diferentes actores involucrados, 
tanto en crítica como en cooperación. 
[CAT] Aquest article cobreix alguns dels punts clau més importants per aprofundir en la iniciativa 
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geopolítica coneguda en xinès com "一带 一路 [yídài yílù]",  traduïda com "Iniciativa del Cinturó i la Ruta 
de la Seda" abreujada com Nova Ruta de la Seda (NRS). El Cinturó es refereix a la principal ruta terrestre 
(en anglès SREB), una àrea de cooperació econòmica que inclou la Xina, Àsia occidental i els països 
europeus. El terme Ruta es refereix també a la ruta marítima (MSR). El NSR no només és important per al 
comerç i la connectivitat regional, sinó també per comprendre la dinàmica del nou món multipolar que 
està sorgint actualment. Fins ara, la dinàmica mundial ha estat dominada durant molt de temps pels 
poders occidentals. Xina s'ha beneficiat de l'entorn pacífic i l'hegemonia dels Estats Units en el món per al 
seu propi creixement econòmic. Tot i així, els esdeveniments recents com la crisi de 2008 i l'elecció del 
president Trump, i la retirada de la política mundial han marcat un punt d'inflexió en la governança 
global. La Nova Ruta de la Seda pot considerar-se com la resposta de la Xina a aquesta feble recuperació de 
l'economia global i la demanda d'una major globalització inclusiva com una contribució a la governança 
econòmica mundial. Centrant-nos en un cas particular, el Corredor Econòmic Xina-Pakistan (CPEC), 
veurem la dificultat involucrada en un projecte d'aquestes dimensions, així com els diferents actors 
involucrats, tant en crítica com en cooperació. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this final project my  aim is to take a deeper insight into one of the most important current 
topics in China's foreign relations and geopolitics, the initiative known in chinese as "一带一
路  [yídài yílù]". Firstly this was referred as "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) in English;  
however this strategy wants  to involve more than one route, therefore it should be 
translated as "Belt & Road initiative" or BRI (LIIA, 2016).  This project was initiated by 
president Xi Jinping in 2013. The Belt and Road strategy includes two major projects: on the 
one hand, the Silk Route Economic Belt (SREB), and on the other hand, the 21st-century 
Maritime Silk Route (MSR). These routes may have side-branches along the way because the 
main objective is to build trade communications between China and  countries in Central 
Asia, Europe and the African continent.  
This ambitious project will involve almost 65 countries, in which China has planned to invest 
around one trillion yuan (around 160 billion US dollars) in various infrastructure projects . 
(PwC's, 2016) 
This is the object of my study: covering some of the most important key points to understand 
which developments are taking  place and the implications that this connectivity plan has for 
the rest of the countries as well as internationally.  My study has  a special focus not only on 
economic and geographic advances, but also in their links towards something bigger. In 
addition, and in order to offer a more detailed view I will explore a particular case among 
the proposed new routes, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).  
My goals with this study are first, achieving a better understanding of one of the most 
relevant initiatives of the 21st century and second  to comprehend China’s role in it by 
analysing the country’s motivation behind its stance towards the other countries. 
What motivated me to choose this topic was, apart from the fact that it’s a very interesting 
one, my personal belief that we’re all affected by it. With this I mean that, since the BRI plans 
to involve some of the most relevant international actors of our time (China, the United 
States, Japan, South Korea and Russia mainly), the decisions taken, or overall, what will be 
set and how, will have a direct or an indirect effect in our lives. Also, I would like to shed 
additional  light around the process and the position of the affected countries.   
The main questions  of this  paper are: What does the "Belt and Road" Initiative include? 
Which countries are involved? How large is the Belt and Road initiative and where does its 
funding come from? What are likely to be the real objectives behind the Initiative? How is 
the CPEC going to affect Pakistan and India relations? 
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My hypothesis are as follows: first, far beyond the myth in the name of the initiative the BRI 
pursues multifaceted economic and political goals; and second, I believe the Belt and Road 
initiative is not only important for trade and regional connectivity, but also for 
understanding  the dynamics of  the new Multi-polar world currently emerging. Analyzing 
China's objectives and the answer that Chinese plans are receiving among the international 
community is of the utmost importance for the future of international relations at a world 
scale. 
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2. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to present the methodology and sources used to analyse the 
geopolitical challenges of the Belt and Road initiative.  
To begin with, in this essay some expressions  will be referred with their initial letters in 
order to economize  space,. Thus  the Belt and Road Initiative will be BRI, the People 
Republic of China will be PRC and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will appear as  
CPEC.  Also, Harvard is the reference system used and all the used materials are in the 
bibliography section available at the end of the document. However, I'll be using footnotes 
occasionally  in order to make certain explanations or to expose some issues  more clearly. 
Second  nowadays all states are strongly interdependent in an extremely complex 
international system. Indeed, the BRI is a hot topic in which states face common global issues 
with regard to international trade and political security worldwide, which  inevitably require 
collective and cohesive global solutions. For this  it is necessary not only to understand the 
BRI's historic framework but also to introduce a geographical view, which offers a much 
clearer perspective on its current political course and the global implications. Also, an 
historic method is required in order to value stabilities and instabilities of political regions 
that allow the adoption of policies and strategies capable of managing the development of 
the initiative.   
The thesis is  structured in four broad parts. The first and second characterize  the Belt and 
Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which constitute the central 
investigations of this essay. Along with them there are some internal subsections that expose 
major problems on these topics, such as the connectivity of BRI, or the challenges that posed  
the CPEC in the region. This structure allows to present the more relevant information in  the 
project and to take different perspectives from the literature analysed .  Third and fourth a  
personal evaluation and the conclusions will be presented, offering an overview of the above 
mentioned materials and further discussion of the issues examined . 
Finally , this thesis relies on data from proprietary and publicly available sources both in 
English and Chinese. To date, BRI has been steadily expanding in both academic research 
papers and the mass media, which have nourished this project. Taking the perspective of 
different articles and other publications not only provides background information but also 
the examination of the projects and their associated trade, financial and political issues. 
However, although these publications enrich the understanding of the MSRI and SREB, the 
scholarly coverage so far has some limitations. For examplethe information contained in this 
paper may differ from previous press releases and external data sources, as data is constantly 
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updated. Also, there are few exhaustive analyses  of the initiative. Many articles are mostly 
descriptive rather than scholarly investigations, and tend to use academic concepts from 
economy, foreign policy analysis and international relations. Most works undertake 
comprehensive analyses of the geopolitical meaning of the MSRI and SREB. Therefore it is 
clear that the politics between China and surrounding countries will be intimately 
intertwined and will produce effects at the global, regional, sub-regional, national and sub-
national levels. (JOHNSON, 2016) 
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3. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
3.1. Definition 
The Belt and Road Initiative could be defined as a development strategy and framework, 
which focuses on  a massive development of  infrastructures promoting economic co-
operation among countries along the proposed routes. The strategy underlines China's 
attempt  to play a bigger role in global affairs, and implies a desired win-win strategy in the 
new international dynamics of the PRC. This plan originally uses in using China’s huge 
economic leverage to invest abroad allowing for the export of strong infrastructure 
development to other world regions as well. 
3.2. Historical background 
3.2.1. The Silk Road Route 
The Belt and Road Initiative originates from the Silk Road, which is the name of the route 
that connected ancient China with Central Asia, Western Asia and the European continent. It 
was already open in the second century AC and was the fundamental trade route, starting in  
China and connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. The term "Silk Road" or "die Seidenstrasse" in 
German was  coined by German  geographer Ferdinand von Richtofen in the late nineteenth 
century. (CHRISTIAN, 2000) This route provided a thoroughfare for goods and ideas 
between China and the other cultures of Central Asia; India and Persia. The route began in  
Chang'an (present-day Xi'an, capital of the Shaanxi province) and crossed Gansu and 
Xinjiang provinces to Central Asia, West Asia until the shores  of the Mediterranean Sea. The 
direct exchange of goods, such as textiles, metalware, and ceramics, inspired the Tang 
Dynasty (618 - 907), which it is known for being one of the most prosperous dynasties in the 
history of China. On the other hand a web of maritime routes connected Chinese seaports 
like Guangzhou with the south of India, the Persian Gulf, and the Eastern coast of Africa. 
(COLBURN, 2009) 
3.2.2.  An International Approach to China 
In 1978 China started opening up under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and acceded to the global 
integration scenario. The economic development has been a core objective for the Chinese 
government since then, joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and soon 
learning  of the usefulness of the institutions that support the new globalized economic order. 
From 1978 to 2003 China's per capita income grew from 379 yuan to  9101 yuan. (LIU, 2006) 
According to some analysts, China's great economic push could overshadow the current 
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order. In other words, "geoeconomic power tends to become geopolitical power" and we can take 
the last century's as a proof. (GOLDEN, 2017:1).  
Up until now, the world dynamics have been long dominated by Western powers. We can 
discover long-term regularities in the development of economic development and 
geographical patterns,  known as global integration cycles. This model highlights the fact 
that an integration is done achieved around a principal power. When applied to the object of 
study the leader in the global scenario may be discerned. (KOLOSOV, 2017)  First, in the 19th 
century it was the United Kingdom which headed to the expansion of the British empire. 
This period is better known as PaxBritannica, the first global integration cycle that lasted until 
1914. Its end involved the two world wars with two decades in between. Later, after the 
Second World War the world entered in a new cycle of global integration led by the United 
States. The U.S. leveraged its combination of military, financial and economic strength to led 
global integration, building a new liberal global scenario. This phenomenon is known as the 
PaxAmericana. This system included the creation of security and economic institutions such 
as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. Furthermore, the U.S also 
built a framework of alliances in Europe and East Asia. The postwar international order was 
also stressed by America’s soft power, its ideological and cultural appeal, projecting its liberal 
values abroad by promoting democracy and human rights. (ZHU, 2016)  
The fear of changes in the established order has led other powers to launch geopolitical 
initiatives in the region. The interpretation of Münkler states in that rivalries between old 
and new global powers do not have to result in direct wars between the competitors, but 
often in conflicts in the periphery of the respective global system. (MÜNKLER, 2005).  This 
interpretation is highly relevant for the current global situation, as the world order is shifting 
from a unipolar to a multipolar one. This can be seen in the U.S attemps to squeeze the 
development of China in South-East Asia. The rapid economic power of China raised 
"increasing wariness, fear, and suspicion from the world, particularly from the United States". (GUO, 
2006:2). In that moment we also find a swift in international power due to the collapse of the 
U.S.S.R. and the Tiananmen crisis. The Chinese answer was starting to promote the idea of 
"peaceful development" (in Chinese heping fazhan 和平发展) to reassure that there was no 
"China Threat" to peace and stability in the region and the world. Also, the new policy 
emphasized  economic development or the deep-roted idea in the inicial plan by the open-up 
policy by Deng Xiaoping back in 1978. Actually, China has beneficiated of the peaceful 
environment and the U.S. hegemony in the world for its own economy growth. Chinese 
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participation in foreign trade and investment has been crucial for its development and the 
pursuit of economic goals has resulted in Chinese foreign policy aiming at improve relations 
with the rest of the countries. Therefore, social and political stability has been crucial for 
development. (LI, 2006)  
3.2.3. A New Era of Globalisation 
Since the 2008 global economic crisis, there has been a clear tendency to propose new forms 
of mega-regional Free-Trade Agreements between two or more continents and countries. For 
example, during the Obama administration, the U.S turned clearly towards Asia with the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, in order to maintain US's  hegemony and strengthen its existence 
and dominance in the Asian-Pacific region based on its own theory of the  "China Threat". 
The TPP was a free trade agreement that linked a number of Asia-Pacific countries and the 
United States but  left China out. In 2012, the U.S. proposed the “Asian-Pacific Rebalancing 
Strategy”, which aimed at reducing  the increasing influence of China through military, 
political and economic ways to strengthen American  intervention in Asian-Pacific affairs.  
In 2013, during various state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, the People's Republic of 
China's current president, Xi Jinping, announced the Silk Route Economic Belt (SREB) and 
the 21st-century Maritime Silk Route (MSR). Both were made a  priority in the  foreign policy 
of the Chinese Communist Party. These two projects were later explained by the National 
Development and Reform Comission (NDRC), which issued official information in the 
document : "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road”,  released in 2015. According to the Chinese government,  this 
plan "can help promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the Belt and Road and regional 
economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and 
promote world peace and development." (NDRC, 2015:1). The different routes were aimed at 
opening "several trade and cultural exchange routes that brought together the main civilizations of 
Asia, Europe and Africa, collectively called the Silk Road for later generations". (NDRC, 2015:1) 
Therefore the “Belt and Road” can be regarded as a China’s response to the weak recovery of 
the global economy and the American policy in the Asia-Pacific region, and represents 
China's demand for inclusive globalization as a contribution to global economic governance. 
China also faces the problem of insufficient demand -and consequent slowdown of GDP, as 
can be seen in figure 1- for its products and limited prospects for profitable domestic 
investment.  There is also a desire to make greater use of external economic ties to seeking 
new markets and attractive investment opportunities abroad to ease overproduction. 
(Kolosov, 2016) 
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Figure 1. China's GDP annual growth rate.  
Sources: Adapted from China Statistical Yearbook 2016. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2016. 
 
In the 2016 United States elections Donald Trump was elected  president, setting back the 
TTP and making clear his intention to adopt major protectionist trade policies and 
immigration restrictions. The “America First” policy has cause uneasiness  about the future 
role of the US in global governance. (GOLDEN, 2017)  
In the Belt Road Forum (BRF) organized in Beijing in mid-May, 2017, the Chinese authorities 
provided a more detailed account of the plan and stressed the importance in building back 
the ancient silk routes that "embody the spirit of peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, 
mutual learning and mutual benefit." (XINHUA, 2017:1) To understand BRI, as Xi Jinping said, 
we must think of it as a new model of cooperation in a new economic globalization system.  
Nowadays globalization problems signal that the current round of economic globalization, 
after 40 years of development, is ready for a major turning point. It is from here where the 
BRI is born, which is China's main plan. The Belt and Road Initiative is aimed to actively 
develop economic cooperation and partnership between China and other  countries, 
optimize resource-deploying, strengthen market-integrating, and promote the global to carry 
out more comprehensive and in-depth regional cooperation. China has taken a clear position 
to defend globalization and boost new multilateralism, confirmed by President Xi’s speech in 
19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (XINHUA B, 2017:1): 
This new era will be an era of building on past successes to further advance our cause, and of 
continuing in a new historical context to strive for the success of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. It will be an era of securing a decisive victory in building a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects, and of moving on to all-out efforts to build a great modern 
socialist country. It will be an era for the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to work together 
and work hard to create a better life for themselves and ultimately achieve common prosperity 
for everyone. It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive 
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with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. It will be an era that sees 
China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind."  
 
Xi Jinping’s dream of “national rejuvenation” seeks the consolidation of the nation’s wealth 
and military powers , the enhancement of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party 
rule, and the taking of central stage in world affairs. In other to achieve its goals the Chinese 
government has undertaken institution-building activities in both national and international 
levels in order to influence the global economic governance. As discussed in Xi's speech, 
China is prepared to lead an alternative to the existing Western model, which would be a 
new model in the 21st century, a Pax Sinica. 
 
3.3. Basic Concepts  
The Eurasia region has a great importance in the present century and could imply a change 
in the existing hegemonic world order . "Eurasia accounts for 75 percent of the world's population, 
60 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. Collectively, Eurasia's potential power 
overshadows even America's" (BRZEZINKSI, 1997:1).  
In the past there have been other countries  interested in starting a project similar to the BRI. 
Countries have developed  their own strategic ideas and these plans provide a reference for 
our understanding of the new Chinese vision. In 1997 the Japanese government proposed a 
“Silk Road Diplomacy” idea which aimed to strengthen Japan’s contacts in Central Asia. In 
2011 the United States launched an initiative "the New Silk Road"  in order to connect 
Afghanistan and Central Asia, which aimed to boost its potential as a transit area between 
Europe and East Asia. (HE, 2013:2) None of these had made much  progress, although  their 
mere existence shows that there is aneed to connect the East and West. Some countries in 
Central Asia are far from international markets and need to strengthen each other’s 
economic cooperation in order to  effectively enter the international market. However none 
of these projects are assimilated to the BRI according to magnitude and concept.  The 
Chinese version of the new Silk Road plan is supposed to be different from the previous 
American and Japanese Silk Road programs, both of which have made little progress. 
China’s idea is to design a non-exclusive platform for cooperation and regional integration 
and does not intend to seek dominance of regional affairs. (HE, 2013:1)  
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The B&R Initiative embraces an area that is home to about 70 per cent of the world’s 
population, produces about 55 per cent of global GDP and has about 75 per cent of known 
energy reserves.  
  
 
Figure 2. Terrestrial and Maritime Silk Proposed Roads 
Source: Lowy Institute, march 2017. 
 
3.3.1. The Belt  
The Belt refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), an economic cooperation area 
including  China and  West Asia and European countries. The initiative calls for the 
integration of the region into a cohesive economic area through building infrastructures, 
increasing cultural exchanges, and broadening trade. The North Belt goes through Central 
Asia, and Russia to Europe. The Central belt goes through Central Asia and West Asia to the 
Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. The South Belt links  China with  Southeast Asia, South 
Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, part from the North Belt, which is largely analogous 
to the historical Silk Road, other areas to be included in the extension of this ‘belt’ are South 
Asia and Southeast Asia. The Belt  connects countries such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, 
Germany, Italy, etc. These countries are  rich in resources of minerals, energy, land tourism, 
etc and some are world industrial powers as well . (DU, 2015)  
3.3.2. The Road  
The term Road refers also to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). This is a 
complementary action plan, aimed at investing and fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, 
Oceania, and North Africa, through several contiguous bodies of water – the South China 
Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, and the wider Indian Ocean area. It connects ASEAN (the 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations), South Asia, West Asia, North Africa and Europe. 
Nowadays, the Road has become a great waterway for maritime exchanges between China 
and other countries such as Vietnam, Singapore, Kenya, Egypt, etc. (DU, 2015) 
3.4. The Silk Road Fund 
This section will explore the existing financing measures for the development of the BRI. 
Given the lack of development in Eurasia, the initiative of the Belt and Road is considered a 
solution to build infrastructures, economic connectivity and regional integration. However, 
to achieve this very large investments are needed . To sustain the project  ADB'S estimations 
lie  around  $ 8 trillion  in national infrastructure and $ 290 trillion in regional infrastructure ,  
just to keep pace with expected needs. (BANYAN, 2013)  As part of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the Chinese government launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
and the Silk Road Fund (SRF).  
 
3.4.1. The Asian Infraestructure Investment Bank 
In 2013 during a state visit in Jakarta (Indonesia) and  in order to celebrate the flourishing 
bilateral trade relationship, Xi Jinping announced a new proposal, the creation of the Asian 
Infraestructure Bank. According to Xi, the bank would be open to other Asian governments 
to participate, and it "would seek to co-operate rather than compete with other sources of 
funds"  (BANYAN, 2013). By other sources we can understand a clear reference to the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) of which China is a member along with most Asian countries, 
America and most European countries as well . By the creation of an alternative investment 
bank, China would not only help some countries that did  not have enough resources but 
also have a greater influence in this bank's decision process.(BANYAN, 2013) 
In 2014 the AIIB was officially launched at a ceremony in Beijing. On March 12, 2015 the 
bank was established multilaterally with the incorporation in the United Kingdom, followed 
by other European countries such as Germany, France and Italy as founding members. The 
bank obtained global status and, despite the presence of multiple countries, the voting ratio 
of China and its central position allowed the government to use the bank as a tool to promote 
BRI. Finally, on 16th January 2016 the AIIB started being operable with a capital of 
US$ 100bn. (GABUSI, 2017). 
The bank tends to follow a modus operandi based in its core values (as stated in the Annual 
Report and Accounts 2016), which are "lean, clean and green". Lean references to the "small 
and experienced management team, a core of highly motivated, skilled and dedicated staff, and a non-
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resident Board of Directors"(AIIB, 2016:4). Clean references to the measures taken by the bank 
in order to avoid corruption. Finally, the bank is committed to financing  infrastructure that 
is environmentally friendly and socially sustainable and "green". (AIIB, 2016) 
 
Figure 3 Approved investment by sectors. 
Source: Annual Report and Accounts 2016. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
 
As displayed in the Figure 2, the Bank main projects have been in energy, transport and 
urban sectors, chosen as a priority.  
 
Figure 4. Loans Approved by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
COUNTRY PROJECT SECTOR 
Project 
cost 
(US$) 
AIIB 
funding 
(US$) 
COFINANCI
NG 
INSTITUTIO
NS1 
APPROVED 
 
Indonesia 
Dam Operational 
Improvement and 
Safety - Phase II 
Multisector 
250 
millions 
125 
millions 
WB March 2017 
Indonesia 
Regional Infra-
estructure 
Development 
Fund 
Multisector 
200 
millions 
100 
millions 
WB March 2017 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Natural Gas 
Infrastructure 
and Efficiency 
Improvement 
Energy 
227 
millions 
60 
millions 
ADB March 2017 
Bangladesh 
Distribution 
System and 
Expansion 
Energy 
262.3 
million 
165 
million 
ADB June, 2016 
Tajikistan 
Dushanbe-
Uzbekistan 
Border Road 
Improvement 
Transport 
105.9 
million 
27.5 
million 
EBRD June 2016 
Indonesia 
National Slum 
Upgrading 
Multisector 
1.7 
billion 
216.5 
million 
WB June 2016 
                                                     
1 ADB, Asian Development Bank; EBRD, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development; EIB, European Investment 
Bank; IFC, International Finance Corporation; OGLG, Oman Global Logistic Group; SEZAD, Special Economic Zone at 
Duqm; WB, World Bank.  
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Pakistan 
National 
motorway M-4 
(Shorkot-
Khanewal 
Section) 
Transport 
273 
million 
100millio
n 
ADB June 2016 
Pakistan 
Tarbela 5 
Hydropower 
Extension 
Energy 
823.5 
million 
300 
million 
WB 
September 
2016 
Myanmar 
Myingyan Power 
Plant 
Energy 
312 
million 
20 
million 
IFC, ADB and 
certain 
commercial 
lenders 
September 
2016 
Oman 
Duqm Port 
Commercial 
Terminal and 
Operational Zone 
Development 
Transport 
353 
million 
265 
million 
SEZAD 
December 
2016 
Oman 
Railway System 
Prepartion 
Transport 
360millio
n 
36millio
n 
OGLG 
December 
2016 
Azerbaijian 
Trans-Anatolian 
Natural Gas 
Pipeline 
Energy 
8.6 
billion 
600 
million 
W.B. 
December 
2016 
Source: Based on "Annual Report and Accounts 2016" (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and 
with Gabusi (2017) 
 
If we take a close look to these  projects, we can find out two main trends  . First i, in 
analyzing the activity of the bank we can see how the main beneficiaries of the year 2016 and 
2017 have been countries based in Eurasia. We can see that all 12 loans approved by the AIIB 
involve seven countries,  all part of BRI in 12 projects that can  be all related to one of the six 
BRI corridors. Second  apart from the energy distribution system in Bangladesh, all projects 
are co-financed by other banks, such as WB or EIB, ADB. This interest by other Western 
banks shows  that these projects were not dominated only by the interests of China, but were 
based on international standards. However, trade relations between China and these seven 
countries have grown at a higher rate than China's trade with the rest of the world (GABUSI, 
2017:33) 
3.4.2. The Silk Road Fund  
To finance the BRI, China has created  the Silk Road Fund (SRF) which is a state-owned 
investment fund established in December 29th, 2014. It is an economic development 
initiative that aims to increase investments along the Belt and Road corridors. The Chinese 
government made in the SRF an initial investment of US$ 40 billion. The main stakeholders 
are the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Investment Corporation, China 
Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China along with other corporations. To date, 
the fund has signed various agreements or  Memorandum's of Understanding (MoU) with 
other countries. In 2015, China Three Gorges Corporation and the Private Power & 
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Infrastructure Board of Pakistan signed a memorandum of cooperation. Later came other 
agreements with Russia and Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia in 2016. (SRF, 2018) 
3.5. Belt and Road's significance to China 
The B&R Initiative has been launched at a time when Chinese foreign policy has become 
more assertive. In words of Nadège Rolland, an analyst at the Think Tank National Bureau 
for Asian Research: “It is not an economic project, it is a geopolitical project — and it is very 
strategic”. This means that the BRI has to be interpreted as a geopolitical plan rather than a 
purely economic one. (JOHNSON, 2016).  One of the unstated purposes of China’s entire Silk 
Road program is to buy political goodwill from countries along the road. President Xi Jin 
Ping said that China’s neighbours had “extremely significant strategic value” at the Peripheral 
Diplomacy Work Conference. The will of China is to improve relations with its neighbours, 
strengthen economic ties and security cooperation. “Maintaining stability in China’s 
neighbourhood is the key objective of peripheral diplomacy. We must encourage and participate in the 
process of regional economic integration, speed up the process of building up infrastructure and 
connectivity. We must build the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 
creating a new regional economic order.” (XINHUA, 2013). The BRI should be regarded 
therefore as a road with geo-pivotal functions of linking and radiating in space. This section 
will cover its high geostrategic value and its strategic situation which may have an important 
impact on China's economic and  security interests, mainly for three reasons (ZHANG & LIU 
& CAI, 2015): First, because it is about guaranteeing the national security and stability of the 
west region. In this sense, China feared that the creation of independent states closer to its 
Western border could bring the Uighur population of the Xinjiang region to support 
separatist tendencies and claim independence from China, considerireligious, ethnic and 
cultural  affinities with Central Asian populations. Second, to improve relations with border 
states and to develop favorable economic and commercial relations. China has developed  
bilateral relations with the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China needs 
to import from these countries raw materials , such as energy, iron, and other metals and 
minerals. On the other hand, China complements the Central Asian economies with 
consumer goods and finished products. Third,  to ensure the transportation of oil and gas 
and thus strengthen its current dependence on coal, as China is an oil importing country. 
(ZHANG & LIU & CAI, 2015) 
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The BRI will support the carefully chosen strategic points which will endow China to create 
a stronger strategic position and improve China's external security environment therefore, 
also expanding its interests and influence towards outside  its borders (LI JUAN, 2016) 
 
3.5.1.  Connectivity 
In total, the “Belt and Road Initiative” covers 64 countries in Southeast, South, Central and 
West Asia and Central and East Europe. Through convenient trade cooperation and 
investment facilitation measures, it will promote economic  development between China and 
the countries along the Belt and Road. We should see the Belt and Road Initiative as a kind of 
network, consisting of railways, highways, airways, and oil and gas pipelines. If we take a 
close look to the SREB and MSR we can see that, if brought into reality,  the different  Silk 
Roads would boost China’s trade with effectively the whole Eurasian continent. China's 
maritime transport system relies heavily on four oceanic  routes and numerous other 
maritime strategic routes.  The transport of goods to the Middle East, Africa and Western 
Europe depends heavily on the Straits of Malacca, Hormuz,  Mandez and the Suez Canal; the 
access to Australia and South-East Asia Transport of goods relies heavily on the Bashi Strait, 
and the Lombok Strait; the transport of goods to North America and Latin America depends 
heavily on the Panama Canal.  (DU, 2015) If we consider for instance China's imports of oil, 
the dependence is enormous . About ninety percent of China's trans-shipment of goods 
needs to be completed by sea. The transport route of oil is unique  and  relies on ocean 
transportation through  the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, about 70 
percent of oil comes  from the Middle East and Africa, whose political situation is very 
unstable. The BRI offers a faster and more secure way to reduce  the transportation of goods 
and oil by the opening of new land passages in the Eurasia which can connect to the Middle 
East, therefore avoiding the dependence on Strait of Malacca. (GAUTAM, 2016) From the 
perspective of ensuring economic security, based on respecting sovereignty and security 
concerns of relevant nations, the “Belt and Road Initiative” will improve the connectivity of 
national infrastructure construction plans and technical standard systems, will push forward 
the construction of international trunk passageways, will build a new Eurasian Land Bridge 
and will develop China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-
Indochina Peninsula economic corridors. (LIU & DUNFORD, 2016) 
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3.5.2. Strategic base  
The Silk Road economic belt is regarded as the most important action  of China towards 
neighbouring countries, first Central Asia. The term "central asia" basically encloses the five 
republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Although 
these countries were in the past part  the Soviet Union, nowadays they have very different  
foreign policies. This is an important geostrategic point in terms of energy resources and 
trade. In recent years , China has invested in the region and has become the main trading 
partner of these republics. Central Asia has become a must for China to arrive  in Europe via 
land and therefore has become a commercial throat and a land bridge connecting the Middle 
East, East Asia, South Asia, Russia, the Caucasus and Europe. (ZHANG & LIU & CAI, 2015) 
Central Asia's "heartland" is not only sparsely populated but also rich in resources. To some 
extent, it plays a key role as China’s strategic buffer zone before  Russia. Given the chaos in 
the Middle East and the fact that the first Eurasian land bridge was completely ruled by 
Russia, Central Asia has become a must for China to reach Europe via land. (CAI, 2017)  
The  objective is to strengthen economic cooperation between Europe and Asia and to build a 
new model of global governance. Since 2009, when the pipeline came operational , China  
has managed to secure enough gas by expanding the Sino- Central Asian gas pipeline. The 
Kazakh-China pipeline will be expanded to an export capacity of 400,000 barrels per day. 
(ZHANG & LIU & CAI, 2015) 
The South China Sea is the first strategic pivot of China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. 
The important geopolitical position of the South China Sea is determined by its geographical 
location. For China, the South China Sea is not only a gateway to China's southbound and 
westbound routes but also a strategic defensive outpost in southeastern China and a 
maritime barrier in southern China, gaining a dominance over the South China Sea and 
facilitating  China's strategic defense in this area . The control of this maritime space  will 
enable China to have direct or indirect control over most of the sea lanes, from the Korean 
Peninsula to the the Nansha Islands, from the Straits of Malacca to Japan, from Singapore to 
Hong Kong, from Guangdong to Manila, and even from East Asia to West Asia, Africa and 
Europe. (ZHU, 2016). 
 
3.5.3. Development 
Due to the advance of maritime transportation and the prosperity of marine trade, the 
Western regions of China, located deep inland, have remained  not really well connected and 
lag behind  the developed and economically powerful  Eastern cities, which are grouped  
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under the umbrella of the Special Economic Zones. (BUSTELO, 1996:51) Since the reform in 
1978 one of the measures taken in order to open up the country's’ economy was to establish 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ). These new zones were based in the Eastern China coast, and 
adopted foreign technology and investment to foster their e export orientation. Contrarily, 
the western regions of China are located deep  inland lacking good connectivity . (CAI, 2017) 
Their economic development level is lower compared to mainland China. In 2013, for 
instance,  per capita income in Western provinces such as Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai and 
Xinjiang was only between a third and a half of that in Eastern provinces such as Guangdong, 
Fujian and Zhejiang, and only a quarter of that in Shanghai and Beijing. (FERDINAND, 2016) 
The BRI is China's main strategy  to help the Western regions to achieve development. From 
the PRC view, it will provide  better conditions of  transportation and logistics and  there will 
be a new economic growth poles formed through the introduction of industries and 
population. (LI JUAN, 2016) 
There have been attempts to open the Western part of the country, such as the "Western 
Development Initiative" presented by the PRC in January 2000. It was an ambitious 
development for  the autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guangxi, Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia, the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, as well 
as the city of Chongqing. The main objective was to reduce the economic imbalance between 
Western China and the central and coastal areas. (ZHU, 2016) However by 2015 it was 
estimated that the West would need 30–50 years to catch up with the rest of China. Among 
its many objectives, SREB is proposed as a measure to promote the development of the 
backward Western Chinese provinces. (LI JUAN, 2016) 
3.5.4. The Internationalisation of Renminbi (RMB) 
The Renminbi (RMB) is the national currency in China. Until few years ago, RMB was only 
valid  for national's internal trade, while the international transactions were conducted in 
foreign currency, specially  US dollars. Over the years, China's dramatic growth in 
international trade has made this country the second largest economy in the world, as well as 
the largest exporter. This economic growth expected to bring to the international table 
enough strength  to make the Renminbi a global reserve currency. The Belt and Road 
Iniciative and the RMB internationalization are China's two major national development 
strategies. Since both can complemented each other, we should take a careful and deep 
approach to Renminbi internationalisation and see its  links to BRI. (R.U.C., 2017) 
According to Bowles and Wang in their 2013 study for the Renminbi internalization: A Journey 
to Where, in recent history, there have been two main contacts between RMB and 
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internationalization. The first was the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when the People's Bank 
of China (PBOC) signed bilateral exchange agreements, the "Chiang Mai Initiative", with  
other countries  in the region (Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Indonesia). This enabled them an easier access to foreign currency. Later, due to the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007, more bilateral currency swap agreements were signed in order to 
provide an answer to the dollar's crisis, which was mainly linked to the United States and 
which fluctuates as a national currency. The agreements facilitated the RMB to continue to 
engage in trade and provide sources of currency reserves. (BOWLES, 2013) 
The PBOC has led the groundwork necessary  to achieve internationalization in  the 
following three steps. First, the setting of  RMB as a global trade currency. Considering 
China's weight in world exports, more and more businesses were accustomed to taking the 
currency into account and using it for payments and receipts for goods and services. Second, 
RMB as a global investment currency,  set the facilities  to become  more freely invested and 
converted into other currencies. And,  third,  the RMB as a global reserve currency facilitated  
catching up with  other currencies such as the US dollar. (BOWLES, 2013) Nowadays the 
Renminbi is  the sixth most common currency in world trade and is used in almost a quarter 
of all transactions across China’s borders. (LOVE & CHEN,  2017) 
In 2015 China joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
founded the New Development Bank (NDB). (LOVE& CHEN, 2017) Moreover, on 
November 30, 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the inclusion of the 
RMB in its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of currencies which effectively took place on 
the 1st October of 2016.  
While there is more progress to be made in its internationalization, this  inclusion positioned 
RMB among other elite global currencies, like the U.S. Dollar, the British Pound, the Euro 
and Japanese Yen. As the Director Siddhart Tiwari has stated , this " reflects China’s expanding 
role in global trade and the substantial increase in the international use and trading of the renminbi." 
(IMF, 2016) 
According to the "RMB Internalization Report of 2017" by the Renmin University of China, 
both foreign direct investment (FDI) and outbound direct investment (ODI) are  important 
pillars of  the development of China's economy. However, the ODI has to be seen as a keen 
strategy to promote RMB internationalization. ODI is an strategy that allows the national 
currency  to expand outside the national scope allowing the growth of trade volume of 
Chinese multinational companies. Also, the ODI promotes the internationalization of 
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financial institutions, which will develop cross-border business and inject investment into 
the RMB offshore market. (Renmin University of China, 2017:30) 
Partly thanks to the global implications of the BRI, there is a significant growth in trade 
between China and another emerging economies that share currencies too volatile to serve 
the same function. Therefore, RMB is an alternative for trade settlement, encouraging a 
robust offshore environment and, more recently, liberalizing access to onshore RMB 
accounts. (LOVE & CHEN, 2017) Also, the BRI provides many opportunities to China in 
spreading the use of RMB in trade, transportations and industry. China's financial sector 
becomes more marked-based and resilient to external forces. Thanks to the process 
undertaking in liberalizing  and internationalizing  its currency the Chinese currency has 
been increasingly used in loans and infrastructure. Among the 101 countries that use RMB, 
57 now use the RMB for at least 10% of their trade with China. (LOVE & CHEN, 2017) 
3.6. Involvement of other countries 
We have noted how the Belt and Road initiative proposed by China is a large  project taking  
into account different neighbour countries. Six economic corridors and one maritime route 
have been proposed under the BRI: 
 
Figure 5. Summary of BRI Economic Corridors 
Corridor Partners Example Projects 
Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor 
Bangladesh, India 
Myanmar 
 China-Myanmar crude oil and liquified 
natural gas (LNG) pipeline 
 Pagma Bridge (Bangladesh) 
 Tunnel construction under Karnaphuli 
River (Bangladesh) 
China-Central Asia-
West Africa 
Economic Corridor 
Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Uzbekistan 
 China-Kazakhstan passenger train 
 Manas airport modernization 
(Kyrgyzstan) 
 Turkey east-west high-speed rail  
China-Indochina 
Peninsula Economic 
Corridor 
Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, Vietam 
 China-Laos Railway 
 Upgrade of Lancang-Mekong ship route 
China-Mongolia-
Russia Economic 
Corridor 
Mongolia, Russia  Altai LNG pipeline (linking Xinjiang 
and Siberia) 
 Altanbulag-Ulaanbaatar-Zamiin-Uud 
highway 
China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor 
Pakistan  Gwadar free zone development 
 Karakoram Highway, Phase II (Thakot-
Havelian) 
 Peshawar-Karachi Motorway 
 25 
 
New Eurasian Land 
Bridge Economic 
Corridor 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Poland, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia 
 China-Europe freight trains (39 routes 
linking China with 9 European 
countries) 
 Hungary-Serbia railway 
 China-Belarus Industrial Park 
 China-Kazakhstan Khorgos 
International Border Cooperation 
Center 
 Port of Pireaus (Greece) 
Source: "Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications" 
Wuthnow (2017) 
 
3.6.1. Central Asia and Russia 
The first partner contact was in 2001 with the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), a negotiation group formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, later on  Uzbekistan was also added. Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia 
maintain  the status of observer countries, while Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, 
Turkey and Sri Lanka are associated States. (ROCHA, 2016) 
China is today’s the largest trade partner of every Asian country. The effects of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank loans and the BRI place China at the center of the 
connectivity network. However, it must be taken into account that there is another power, 
Russia, which also has great influence in the region. (ZHANG, 2015)  
At first, Russia held competing interests in the region and saw the Belt and Road Initiative as 
China’s replacing Russia’s role in the region. At that time Russia had its own integration 
initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), aimed at coordinating economic policies for 
unimpeded trade and investment. However, Russia’s need for modernization and long-term 
development made the Belt and Road Initiative a valuable contribution to the Kremlin’s 
interest and its “Turn to East” policy. (ROCHA, 2016) 
The construction of the new Silk Road Economic Belt will lead China and Russia to cooperate 
with major projects in the fields of oil and natural gas extraction  oil pipelines, joint-stock 
refineries, transportation and other resources, energy and infrastructure construction, while 
the Maritime Silk Road will provide resources for Russia. (DU, 2015)  
In May 2015 Russia accepted China’s role in Central Asia while China would treat the EAEU 
as an equal negotiating party. “Competition is the engine of all sectors, both the economy 
and politics. So, in my opinion, there are neither contradictions nor tragedies. We have 
competition in some [sectors] and cooperation in others. At present we have more points of 
contact in cooperation with China.” said Putin in response to China's ambitious 
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advancement for “Silk Road Economic Belt” strategy in Central Asia. (BIN, 2014) 
Cooperation with Russia not only helps China to obtain resources and expand markets, but 
also ensures  a basic stability in the global strategic pattern (big triangle) while confronting  
the strategic risk posed by the United States.  
 
3.6.2. Europe 
Before BRI,  in 1992., the European Union had launched several projects under its Transport 
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia initiative China’s BRI corridors are to reach Europe through 
two railway corridors under the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. The 
New Eurasian Land Bridge, running from Western China to Western Russia and Europe and 
the Baltic region through Kazakhstan. (WUTHNOW, 2017) Europe is currently the largest 
and most developed market in the world. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was 
warmly welcomed by many European countries that joined as founding members. China’s 
BRI corridors are assumed to reach Europe through two railway corridors under the Silk 
Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. The BRI corridor will have its main 
European hubs in Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. However, as recent events such 
as  the global financial crisis, have hit the European economies or the election of U.S 
President Trump and the rise in  protectionism measures, have made  clear to Europe the 
need for an ally in safeguarding  multilateral trade regimes. (LIU, 2018) Taking that into 
account, we expect that railway trade with China would boost the competitive advantage of 
the industries located nearby, and also lower railway cost, increasing therefore  trade 
volumes (GABUSI, 2017) 
 
3.6.3. Africa 
The Belt and Road Initiative is the first integration plan seeking to integrate the African 
continent. China is the main investor and source of aid in Africa and has promoted China’s 
BRI as a connectivity project offering funding to those African countries without access to 
Western international funding institutions. For example, port investment plans have been 
proposed in West African countries such as Congo, Gabon, Ghana and Nigeria, as well as 
from North, East and South Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa, 
among others).  (ROCHA, 2016) Africa is still a rich territory with  industrial development 
needs. China is interested in Africa's mineral and raw material supplies. Some have pointed 
that this China-Africa relationship of exchange of raw materials for investment resources is a 
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new way of colonialism. However, China is offering Africa a brand of scholarships in order 
to train its population, inviting Africans to Chinese universities. Also, three-quarters of the 
workers are local. China also favours  loans to cover the African infrastructure deficits. 
(BRÄUTIGAM, 2018) 
3.6.4. East Asia 
The Pacific Ocean is strongly influenced  by the presence of the U.S and Japan. China and 
Japan  have maintained  frictions because of the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands and the region in 
general, where they dispute the hegemony. (BLANCHARD, 2006) These islands are a 
potentially  strong source of oil. The Japanese  have continuously strengthened their 
maritime security cooperation and all-round strategic cooperation with the United 
States.(DU, 2014) and want to preserve their  leadership in East Asia, both political and 
economic . The East China Sea remains a point of friction between the two countries. 
However since Trump’s came into office in 2016, the US have carried out less interventionist 
policies and have even  withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was aimed at 
containing China expansion. The rest of  countries in the region joined the BRI and therefore 
left  Japan isolated in the South-east region. (RILEY, 2017) 
In 2017 Abe's decided to join the BRI. This represents a change in the worn-out policy 
between the two countries. During the last years Japan has been losing weight in the region; 
hence,  a pact of this caliber would help the Japanese economy. Tokyo’s new position on the 
BRI includes loans through government-backed financial institutions to promote cooperation 
among Japanese and Chinese private companies in the fields of energy and logistics. (SANO, 
2018) 
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4. THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a project that forms part of China’s efforts 
to strengthen its trade and commerce connectivity with different regions of the world. 
According to the Official Website of the CPEC, the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a 
framework of regional connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will 
have positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republic, and the region" as 
well. (CPEC, 2017) Basically, China and Pakistan have a project in common: the construction 
of a new trade channel  that will connect the two countries and strengthen commerce and 
economic cooperation among them. This corridor is the centrepiece of China’s One Belt One 
Road;  that is, a Chinese global vision of infrastructure connectivity of the country with the 
rest of the world. 
The CPEC is a large  project that will imply  the construction of highway and railway links 
running through most part of Pakistan. It will start from Gwadar, a port city in the province 
of Balochistan, and pass through other parts of the Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
provinces until arriving to the country's capital Islamabad. The current capital of Pakistan is 
in  the Northern province and very  close to western China, where the railway line  will 
follow to Gilgit and Baltisan and then through  the Khunjrab Pass will culminate  in Kashgar, 
a  chinese city in the Xinjiang. The whole project is expected to be completed by 2030, 
whereas related short-term projects including motorways and energy projects are to be 
finished by 2017-2018. (SIAL, 2014) 
  
Figure 6. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
Source: Jia Cui (2014)  
 29 
 
Initially, these infraestructure projects  required an investment  of $34 billion. However, 
China later approved additional financing for  $46 billion for Independent Power Projects 
(IPPs) in 2015. In April  2017 the figure went up to $62 billion, to include  the establishment 
of industrial zones. (SIDDIQUI, 2017) 
The importance of  Gwadar  relies on its situation as a seaport in the south of Pakistan. It will 
not only serve as a trade nerve but also as an energy corridor since it is  located near the 
Strait of Hormuz, which channels about one third of the world's oil trade. Basically, by using 
Gwadar, China ensures a much shorter, cheaper and safer route than the current one 
through the straits of Malacca to China's Eastern sea. After the oil has reached Shanghai or 
the Chinese East Coast, it has to be transported thousands of miles in land to Western  China. 
Using Gwadar  instead would reduce the distance and possibly costs as well . (SIAL, 2014) 
 
4.1. China-Pakistan Relations: Antecedents  
The modern relations between Pakistan and China started in 1951, when Pakistan became 
one of the first countries that recognized the People's Republic of China. From that moment, 
the two countries developed friendly relations and set up mutual cooperation objectives. In 
January 1963, both signed their first bilateral long-term trade agreement. Between 1950s and 
1960s Pakistan was a member of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South 
East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). However Pakistan maintained its friendly relations 
with the People's Republic of China and played a role as a "bridge state" between the U.S and 
China from 1969 to 1971. With joint efforts from both sides, Sino-Pakistani economic and 
trade cooperation has seen good progress. Especially since the 1990s, bilateral trade volume 
has witnessed relatively fast growth.  (CHINA DAILY, 2006)  
 
4.2. Pakistan 
In Pakistan there is a clear consensus among most political parties in keeping good relations 
with China. From Pakistan's point of view,  China is a friend in bilateral relations involving 
military and  economic cooperation or geostrategic issues. (SIAL, 2014) 
If we take  a closer look to Pakistan's foreign trade we can see that China is the main country 
in imports. However, while looking at Pakistan's exports, the main country is the USA. The 
CPEC is supposed to strengthen Pakistan's foreign trade in favor of rising exports to China.   
(KHALID, 2015) 
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Furthermore, the new project would set sub-regional economic corridors along with  short 
and long-term investments, employment opportunities and tourism. (Pakistan-China 
Institute, 2017) 
The establishment of industrial zones would imply  great economic, political and strategic 
advantages  for  other regions in Pakistan. For example, the SEZs in the Pakistani ports of 
Gwadar and Kashgar and the rail and road connectivity between the two. The economic 
shortages that Pakistan has faced the last years would be reduced by these major projects. 
(SIDDIQUI, 2017)   
The Pakistan's position  is to stress the importance of the neweconomic region. While China 
is projecting outside the country its new OBOR initiative, this might mean Pakistan is aiming 
to become one of its centers and take advantage of the  benefits afforded by CPEC. (JIA, 2014) 
 
4.3. Chinese Expectations 
Within the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor it is clear that China's position is very serious 
about accomplishing its aims and accessing  the Eurasia region. On the economic front, 
China is the biggest beneficiary, and for the Chinese, the relationship has a geo-strategic 
significance. 
Firstly, China wants to expand its influence. OBOR not only will enable China to exert 
greater regional influence, but boost its trade. In terms of  the current Yuan's usage this will 
also allow the Yuan  to expand as an international reserve currency.  
Furthermore, China  currently depends on maritime trade while  the CPEC initiative seeks to 
change that geographical advantage to China's favor. The CPEC ensures a perfect way to 
unify the economy and trade routes of Europe through Middle-East and Asia, and make 
China independent from maritime constraints . The corridor through Gwadar gives  a 
shorter  access to the Middle East and Africa. CPEC will make Pakistan the most reliable, 
cost-effective, and fastest route for carrying out trade with China. Once CPEC becomes fully 
operational, Pakistan will unofficially become China’s most important gateway to the rest of 
the world. (JIA, 2014) 
Secondly, the CPEC it's the perfect course of action to correct  regional disparities in China. 
The Eastern and Southern regions of China have lagged behind in terms of growth. The 
corridor also promises to open up remote, landlocked Xinjiang, and create incentives for 
both state and private enterprises to expand economic activity and  jobs in this under-
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developed region. In sum, these regions will be now better connected to the world. 
(DEVONSHIRE, 2017)  
 
4.4. Challenges 
Pakistan and China are both facing a number of political, economic and social crises.  
To start with, in China the region of  Kashgar is located in  the centre of the Xinjiang region. 
Xinjiang is one of the five autonomous regions of the PRC and , together with the Tibet, it is 
the only territory of the country in which the Chinese do not constitute the majority. The 
majority group is formed by the Uyghurs, one of the 55 ethnic groups officially recognized 
by the Chinese State. Most Uighurs are Muslim and Islam is an important part of their life 
and identity. Their language is related to Turkish, and they regard themselves as culturally 
and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. (BBC, 2014) In this region there is a growing 
risk of the spread of extremist Islamist movements. In the approach of the Chinese 
authorities the limited development of Xinjiang is clearly a centrifugal force that strengthens 
the Uyghur separatism with recent upsurges in violence. China has combined this intense 
political and cultural repression with the major socio-economic development plans, with the 
clear expectation that the prosperity and transformation of the region will dilute the Uighur 
resistance and strengthen the integration of Xinjiang with the rest of the PRC.  (ZHU, 2016) 
On the other hand, between Gwadar and Kashgar, the corridor passes through areas 
controlled by Pakistan's Taliban insurgents such as Pakistan's north-western border with 
Afghanistan. (AHMAR, 2015). 
Pakistan suffers from  a lack of internal stability. The successful implementation of CPEC 
depends on the political situation of a country  deep-set in inter-provincial conflicts, with 
strong  opposition in the  provinces of  Baluchistan, Sindh, and KPK. There is  repeated 
distress raised by the provinces on the massive and unequal distribution of resources, and 
non-transparent nature of the government’s actions on CPEC. (KHAN, 2016) 
Involving CPEC, every region  is fighting to obtain  the maximum benefits. Baluchistan lacks 
in development and infrastructure, and also lacks of security for being home of a several 
number of uprising forces.  The Sindh, KPK and Gilgit Baltistan are facing a lack of basic 
infrastructures . (HUNT, 2017) 
On the security front, Pakistan not only lacks unity among provinces, but is also facing 
an insurgency in the Baluchistan province, where the port of Gwadar is located. It is hoped 
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that CPEC will boost development in the region, and will eventually help in quelling 
insurgency. (BBC, 2015)  
 
4.5. The CPEC and its implications for India 
India has repeatedly boycotted the Belt and Road initiative along with the CPEC plan, 
raising objections to the corridor's route. In the past, both India and Pakistan were involved 
in wars to dispute these territories. Currently, the new chinese OBOR project is threatening 
peace in the region. (ROQUE, 2008) 
 
Figure 7 Proposed China-Pakistan economic corridor 
Source: BBC News, Asia.  22nd April, 2015. 
The CPEC plan runs through the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan (which has been under Pakistani 
control since 1947 but it is claimed by India) and the Kashmir, occupied by India, and 
therefore, is seen as trespassing India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, if 
the CPEC along with other Chinese projects become a reality , which also involves other 
countries, India would be surrounded by Chinese dominance and lose importance  in the 
Indian Ocean. This is called "string pearls" a geopolitical theory claiming  that China would 
surround India by the ocean. This means India not only risks isolation but also has much to 
lose out in terms of economic power. To mitigate the damage, India  should build ties with 
other countries and increase its spending on infrastructure. (ARPI, 2017) 
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However, India and Pakistan adhered as formal members to the SCO in 2017. With the entry 
of India and Pakistan the organization takes an important step in its quest to stabilize the 
current conflicts in the region.  
The member among this organisation would benefit from the free trade with China that Xi 
Jinping offered. India's inclusion in the SCO organisation might be a shift in India’s  foreign 
policy and  benefit from the deal with China. (CASEY, 2017) 
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5. PERSONAL EVALUATION 
In this section some of the recent concerns about the geopolitical aspects of the initiative will 
be reviewed. There are many more concrete objectives, not purely economic, behind the BRI. 
Among all, there is little doubt that the main objective of the initiative is helping China to 
achieve geopolitical goals by economically binding China’s neighbouring countries closer.  
From my point of view, I believe that China has followed a very well thought route since the 
beginning of the reforms in 1978, with a greater view for international projection. Hu's 
speech at the Beijing Globe Forum of Fortune in 2005, made it clear that China's intentions 
for the coming years were to achieve a greater economic return, comparable to the United 
States and Europe. Later, during the 60th anniversary of the World Anti-Fascist War Victory, 
China stressed that had no interest in "using force or attempting to use force, in order to realize 
one's own country's interests will only result in failure, and does not conform with the trend of 
human history, which is conducive to each other's interests "(LI, 2006: 145) Ten years after, the 
new president discourse still follows this ideological line. Xi Jingping's speech during "the 
70th anniversary of the World Anti-Fascist War Victory" in 2015 looks a lot like what was 
done ten years ago by PRC President Hu Jintao: 
"In the interest of peace, China will remain committed to peaceful development. We Chinese love 
peace. No matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion. 
It will never inflict its past suffering on any other nation. The Chinese people are resolved to pursue 
friendly relations with all other countries, uphold the outcomes of the Chinese People's War of 
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and make greater 
contribution to mankind."  
Xi Jinping speech at the 70th anniversary of the World anti-fascist war victory.  
 
In general terms, China is interested in this idea of peaceful development. From a  realistic 
approach this is in response of the enormous surface in its economic integration plan, where 
peace is needed in order to secure China’s huge investments in Eurasia and Africa. However, 
if we take a close look to the actions done to date, we can see a failure in reducing some of 
the hazards that threaten the BRI, such as terrorism, separatism and extremism, which we've 
already seen in some of the key places in where the BRI is to be developed. The measures 
proposed do not answer well at the bottom-line problems which appear in different 
situations. For instance, in the Xinjiang province the chinese perspective is to focus on 
economic development as the main solution that will eradicate "poverty" and by that, the 
"root cause" of extremism in the region. (WUTHNOW, 2017) Also, there are few territorial 
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tensions among other major countries such as India, and also in the South China Sea. 
Although the BRI's optimist approach by claiming the "integration" and "cooperation" idea, 
the plan is far from being an alleviation to solve these disputes and strengthen the idea that 
China is not willing to sacrifice its own territorial claims. (ZHANG, 2015) 
 
The BRI has also been announced as the "Marshall Plan" of China by many analysts. Indeed, 
both plans share some similarities for example, in exporting the country's capital to other 
countries. This plan not only will help ease the Chinese overcapacity to the underdeveloped 
regions, but also boost its economic power towards diplomatic and strategic objectives and 
consolidating China's position in Eurasia. (TIEZZI, 2014). However the CPC's official line 
avoids a direct discussion of the BRI'S strategic benefits and security risks, which helps in 
reducing suspicions of China's intentions among other major countries. (WUTHNOW,2017).   
The BRI is different from the Marshall Plan in motivation, challenges, and potential impact. 
First, we should note down the ideological difference in the China's behaviour given the 
historical background. China might not follow the same steps as U.S. or Great Britain to 
become a geopolitical power. Second, there are many challenges to face in order to achieve 
their goals. The BRI is an initiative that encompasses many territories inside and outside 
China, so cultural and structural factors must be taken into account, for example, in 
cooperation with Xinjiang province and Central Asia, birthplace of the notorious religious 
extremists in recent years, or the territorial conflicts China in the South China Sea. 
(WUTHNOW,2017).   
This last point arouses another problem, which is that some great powers may feel 
threatened in their interests and hegemony, like the US. Previously, we have seen the US's 
strategy to strengthen its presence in the Asia Pacific area with the "Pivot to Asia" plan. 
(FORD, 2017) This plan aroused tension with China, which felt itself surrounded. At first, 
this policy was excused in the growing importance of the area as an economic focus, the U.S. 
component. I had a lot of military weight. It was clear that more and more seemed a policy of 
military restraint. (WUTHNOW, 2017) Therefore the BRI could be an answer of non-
confrontational strategy with the U.S.  
Unlike the U.S with Marshall plan, China does not plan to leave out some countries as the 
U.S did with the communist countries. The initiative is open to all countries who are 
interested in development, regardless of their regime types. (CHEN, 2014) But China's 
relation with some Middle Eastern countries awakens fears. Its non-positioning in front of 
other countries which may have democratic problems is heavily criticized. It may seem that 
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China doesn't pay attention to social problems as long as they can benefit economically. 
(GABUSI, 2016) This non-intervention in part of the world social problems and conflicts 
creates a more non-trust of the Chinese values in front of western countries. Historically, the 
Taiwan issue and the Tiananmen Square protests of  1898 its recent in the international 
community and shows the major politic issues that China still have. ( BRÄUTIGAM, 2018)  
Similarly, another trouble with the Belt and Road Initiative is the silence involving the main 
structural challenges that will need to be addressed if it intends to truly succeed. (CAI, 2017) 
China is gradually emerging as a global investor. (KOLOSOV, 2017) Such a huge project 
could derivate to economic threatens with overseas loans, including political instability and 
the economic viability of many projects, which include credit risk, poor governance and 
corruption. The main concern includes that the political goals behind could drive some 
countries in taking advantage of BRI and sign up to with no intention of repaying the loans. 
For most Asian countries, the interest in BRI is motivated by a practical recognition of its 
relevance for advancing their own economic goals, be it promoting foreign investment or 
building infrastructure. The lack of political trust between China and some BRI countries, as 
well as instability and security threats in others, are considerable obstacles. The common 
tendency between Chinese analysts often fail to consider the linkages between regional 
integration and conflict and facilitating international crime. (CAI, 2017) 
In my view, these different aspects inevitably lead the current situation to a demand for a 
more stable plan. In pursuance of risk's reduction and working towards a potential strategic 
planning, the implementation of projects can help expand regional influence and also 
preserving cooperation. On the other hand, despite an optimistic official narrative, Chinese 
strategists should note the cultural differences among the BRI's countries and how the 
initiative is perceived among the regions. Also, this Initiative is ambitious enough to deserve 
a higher dialogue between the major actors like Europe, where the road is meant to end. I 
firmly believe Europe could play a great role in the US-China mediation among other 
countries in Central Asia, since it's the most developed part in action. It is clear that Europe 
can only benefit of multileral trade, so that makes multilateralism a priority to prevail 
against closed and competing initiatives towards like US's measures.  Only along those 
common avenues will China be able to build long-lasting cooperation, bridging gaps for 
mutual benefits. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout this work we have been able to see clearly what China is proposing with the Belt 
and Road Initiative. This is a project committed to leading a new phase of globalization, with 
bilateral treaties promoted by economic development. We have also seen different methods 
of applying this initiative. China bets on its interests but also attempts to meet those of others. 
It is clear that the country needs to look for new horizons, be it in trade or regional 
agreements. So far, the Belt and Road Initiative is still in formation and therefore a promise 
for the rest of the geographical areas where it is projected. However, the BRI turns out to be 
an initiative of change offered by China designed in the long term. This Initiative is an open 
and flexible cooperation and integration proposal that seeks to be implemented globally in a 
political context of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the different region and the 
countries that comprise it, in accordance with the principles of China’s foreign policy. 
Undoubtedly, the success of the BRI can bring prestige to China, increasing its economic 
power, and with it, its political influence. The Chinese economy will benefit in all its areas, in 
sectors such as construction, manufacturing, services, banking, etc. China and its companies 
will be able to make the transition from exporting low value-added products to products 
with higher added value, through high-tech investment projects, including high-speed trains, 
as well as nuclear plants. In this way, and in turn, the industrial and  service sectors will be 
favored and expanded. China will thus be able to consolidate its position as a regional power 
not only in East Asia, but throughout Asia, in Africa and even Europe, strengthening its 
position as an actor of global relevance. 
However, the challenges that China must face to achieve the success of its BRI project are 
multiple. Among them, we can mention the economic issue, which is key to the project. In 
that sense, the regional conflicts problem must be solved in the medium term, if it is desired 
to maintain sustained economic growth. Also, internal and external security issues are 
extremely important. Maintaining the social peace of China is essential in that regard. 
Therefore, the BRI is a reflection of China’s ability to define its foreign policy principles and 
standards in international cooperation while being recognized as legitimate in the eyes of 
other countries.   
 38 
 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES USED 
AHMAR, M., (2015). Strategic Meaning of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Institute 
of Strategic Studies Islamabad Journal. 34 (4) [online] Available at: 
<http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Moonis-
Ahmar_3435_SS_41_20142015.pdf > [Accessed the 20th September 2017] 
AIIB (2016). Annual Report and Accounts 2016. Asian Infraestructure Investment Bank 
[online] Electronic resource available at: <https://www.aiib.org/en/news-
events/news/2016/annual-
report/.content/download/Annual_Report_2016.pdf >[Accessed the 1st of May 2018] 
ARPI, CLAUDE, (2017). "China-Pakistan's dam projects in Gilgit Baltistan should worry 
India. Daily'O. Available at: <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/china-obor-cpec-gilgit-
baltistan-indus-water-treaty-pakistan/story/1/17750.html> [Accessed the 10th 
December 2017]. 
BANYAN, (2013). Asian Infrastructure Bank. The Economist, Analects,. 4th of  October 2013. 
Available at: <https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/10/asian-
infrastructure-bank-1> [Accessed the 12th of March 2018] 
BBC, (2014). Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs? BBC News. 26th of 
September 2014. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
26414014> [Accessed the 5th of May 2018] 
BBC (2015). Is China-Pakistan "silk road" a game-changer? BBC News, Asia.  22nd April, 
2015. Available online at: < http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32400091>  
[Accessed the 3rd of April 2018] 
BLANCHARD, JEAN-MARC F., (2006). "China's Peaceful Rise and Sino-Japanese territorial 
and maritime tensions"  In Guo, Sujian (Ed.) China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century. 
Domestic and International Conditions (pp.211-238). Aldershot: Ashgate. (original work 
n.d).  
BRÄUTIGAM, DEBORAH. (2018) U.S politicians get China in Africa all wrong. The 
Washington Post. 4th of April, 2018.  Available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/12/china-
africa/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a7c691788dd4 [Accessed the 5th May 2018] 
BRZEZINSKI, Z., (1997). A Geostrategy for Eurasia. Foreign Affairs,76 (5), 50-64. Available at: 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1997-09-01/geostrategy-eurasia> 
[Accessed the 2nd February 2018] 
BIN, YU. (2014). China-Russia Relations: Putin’s Glory and Xi’s Dream. Comparative 
Connection, Volume 15 Issue 3.  January 2014. Accessible at: 
<http://cc.csis.org/2014/01/putins-glory-xis-dream/> [Last access 1st of May] 
BOWLES, PAUL & WANG, BAOTAI. (2013). Renminbi Internationalization: A Journey to 
Where?. Development and Change 44 (6). International Institute of Social Studies. 
November 2013. 
BUSTELO, P. & LOMMEN, Y. (1996) La economía china ante el siglo XXI, Veinte años de reforma. 
Editorial Síntesis.  
CAI, PETER. (2017). Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative. Lowy Institute. March 
2017. Available at: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-
belt-and-road-initiative> [Accessed the 1st of October 2017] 
 39 
 
CASEY, MICHEL (2017). It's official: India and Pakistan join Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. The Diplomat. Crossroads Asia. 12th of June 2017. Available at: 
<https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/its-official-india-and-pakistan-join-shanghai-
cooperation-organization/> [Accessed the 1st of May 2018] 
CHEN, DINGDING (2014). China's Marshall Plan is much more. The Diplomat. 10th of 
November 2014. Avaible at: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinas-marshall-
plan-is-much-more/> 
CHINA DAILY. (2006). China-Pakistan relations. China Daily. 14th November 2006. 
Available at: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-
11/14/content_732562.htm> [Accessed the 1st January 2018] 
CHINA DAILY. (2014). China studying new Silk Road rail link to Pakistan.  
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-06/28/content_17621848.htm 
CHINA DAILY (2015). Full text: Xi's speech at the 70th anniversary of war victory, China 
Daily, 3rd of September 2015. Available at: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015victoryanniv/2015-
09/03/content_21783362.htm> [Accessed the 2nd March 2018] 
CHRIS DEVONSHIRE-ELLIS. (2017). The Beijing Belt-Road Forum: What we learned about 
China's intentions. China Briefing. 23rd of May 2017. 
CHRISTIAN, DAVID.(2000). Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World History, 
Journal of World History 11.1. Spring 2000. 
SRF (2018). The Silk Road Fund. Fund History. Silk Road Fund, Official Website in english. 
Beijing. Available at: 
<http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23775/23778/index.html.> [Accessed 
the 1st of May 2018] 
CPEC. (2017). China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Introduction. CPEC Webpage.  
Available at: <http://cpec.gov.pk/> [Accessed the 9th of October 2017] 
DU, D. B., & MA, Y. H. (2015). “一带一路”：中华民族复兴的地缘大战略杜德 [One Belt and 
One Road: The grand geo-strategy of China's rise]." Geographical Research, 2015, 34(6): 
1005-1014. 
GAUTAM SEN. (2016). China-One Belt and One Road Initiative: Strategic & Economic 
Implications. Vivekananda International Foundation. January 2016. 
GABUSI, GIUSEPPE. (2016). "Crossing the River by Feeling the Gold: The Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Financial Support to the Belt and 
Road Initiative". China & World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2017, pp. 23-45.  
GOLDEN, SEAN. (2017). A “China Model” for the “New Era. CIDOB, No. 503, 2017. 
COLBURN CLYDESDALE, HEATHER. (2009). Internationalism in the Tang Dynasty (618–906). 
April 2009. In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, 2000.  Source Available at: 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/inte/hd_inte.htm [Accessed the 15th of 
February 2018]   
FORD, JOHN. (2017). The Pivot to Asia Was Obama's Biggest Mistake. The Diplomat [online] 
Available at:  https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-pivot-to-asia-was-obamas-
biggest-mistake/ [Accessed the 16th of April] 
 40 
 
HE, MAOCHUN AND ZHANG, Y. (2013) 新丝绸之路经济带的国家战略分 [Analysis of 
National Strategy of the New Silk Road Economic Belt]. People's Forum Academic 
Frontier, Tsinghua University Center for Economic Diplomacy, No. 23, 2013. 
Available at: People.com http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1231/c40531-
23993161.html. [Accessed the 1st of May 2018]  
HUNT, KATIE. (2017). Grave concern over Chinese teachers reportedly killed by ISIS in 
Pakistan. CNN. June 10th of 2017. 
IMF. (2016). IMF adds Chinese Renminbi to Special Drawing Rights Basket. International 
Monetary Fund News, 30th September 2016. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-
Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket [Accessed the 1st of May 2018]. 
JIA, CUI. (2014). Infraestructure biggest challenge for Silk Road. China Daily. 27th of April 
2014. 
JIA, CUI. (2014). China studying new Silk Road rail link to Pakistan. China Daily, 28th of 
June 2014. 
JOHNSON, KEITH. (2016). China's New Silk Road into Europe is about more than money.  
Foreign Policy. 1st June of 2016. 
WUTHNOW, JOEL. (2017). "Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Strategic Rationales, 
Risks, and Implications." China Strategic Perspectives 12, 27th of September. Institute 
for National Strategic Studies (INSS). National Defense University Press.  
KHALID, SAAL. (2015). A statistical look into Pakistan's foreign friendships. The Express 
Tribune, Business. 3rd of May 2015. 
KHAN, SABINA. (2016). Significance of CPEC. The Express Tribune. 4th of September 2016. 
KOLOSOV, VLADIMIR A. ET AL. (2017). The Chinese Initiative “The Belt and Road”: 
A Geographical Perspective. Geography, Environment, Sustainability, GES 
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 5-20.  
LIIA (2016). BRI Instead of OBOR – China Edits the English Name of its Most Ambitious 
International Project. Latvian Institute of International Affairs. July 2016. Available at: 
< http://liia.lv/en/analyses/bri-instead-of-obor-china-edits-the-english-name-of-its-
most-ambitious-international-project-532>. [accessed the 9/11/2017] 
LI JUAN, LIU. (2016). The Belt and Road Initiative Working Towards a Global 
Vision. Journalism and Mass Communication, 6(2). 
LI, QINGSI. (2006). "The International Conditions of China's peaceful rise: challenges and 
opportunities"  In Guo, Sujian (Ed.) China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century. Domestic 
and International Conditions (pp.141-158). Aldershot: Ashgate. (original work n.d). 141-
158 
LIU, GUOLI. (2006). "The Dialectic Relationship between Peaceful Development and 
China's Deep Reform"  In Guo, Sujian (Ed.) China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century. 
Domestic and International Conditions (pp.17-37). Aldershot: Ashgate. (original work 
published in 2005). 
LIU, W., & DUNFORD, M. (2016). Inclusive globalization: unpacking China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. Area Development and Policy, 1(3), 323–340.  
LIU, XIAOMING (2018). Europe and China must stand together agains protectionism. 
Financial Times. 28th of March 2018. Available at: 
 41 
 
<https://www.ft.com/content/5098a0f6-3119-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498> [Accessed 
the 14th of April 2018] 
LOVE, HILARY & CHEN, CHRIS. (2017) Chinese Renminbi Internationalization: Guide to 
recent developments. International Services. The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 
2017. Available at: <https://www.pnc.com/content/dam/pnc-ideas/articles/CIB-
TM-China-Whitepaper-Update.pdf> [Accessed the 1st May 2018] 
MÜNKLER, H. (2005) Ch 2: Empire, Imperialism and Hegemony: a Necessary Distinction. 
in Empires translated by Patrick Camiller. Polity Press 2007,  Cambridge, UK. 
Available at Google Books: 
<https://books.google.es/books?hl=ca&lr=&id=zQWl1eG9DEoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7
&dq=munkler+empire&ots=xccDWNxAUo&sig=TeV5AHnheBLxACtcAQpFOOrJC9
g#v=onepage&q=direct%20wars&f=false> [Accessed the 3rd of April 2018] 
NDRC. (2015). Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road. National Development and Reform Comission. Available 
online: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html 
[Accessed the 8th of November 2017] 
PWC'S. (2016). China's new silk route. The long and winding road. February 2016. Growth 
Markets Centre. PDF available at: www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-
center/assets/pdf/china-new-silk-route.pdf [accessed the 9th of November 2017] 
PAKISTAN-CHINA INSTITUTE. (2017). "Prime minister Nawaz Sharif addresses the Belt and 
Road forum in Beijing". May 15th 2017. (post-conference document)  
RILEY, CHARLES. (2017). Trump's decision to kill TPP leaves door open for China. 
CNNMoney (London). January 23rd. Available at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/tpp-trump-china/ [Accessed 
the 30th of April] 
ROCHA PINO, MANUEL DE JESUS. China y la Integración Megarregional: La Nueva Ruta de 
la Seda Marítima en África. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals. No. 114, 2016, pp. 87-
108.  Accessible at: 
<https://www.raco.cat/index.php/RevistaCIDOB/article/viewFile/316647/406747> 
[Accessed 15 May 2017] 
ROQUE, JOYCE. (2008). "China's Borders. China and Pakistan's Enduring Alliance." China 
Briefing (13) 12th September 2008. 
R.U.C. (2017).  "RMB Internationalization Report 2017." Research Report No.1702 (EN). 
15th July, 2017. International Monetary Institute, Renmin University of China.  
SANO, SHUTARO (2018). Japan's buckles up to join China's Belt and Road. East Asia 
Forum. 20th March 2018. Available at: 
<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/03/20/japan-buckles-up-to-join-chinas-belt-
and-road/> [Accessed the 2st April 2018] 
SIAL, S. (2014). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: an assessment of potential threats 
and constraints. Conflict and Peace Studies, 6(2), 24. 
SIDDIQUI, SALMAN. (2017). CPEC investment pushed from $55b to $62b. Business The 
Express Tribune,.  April 12th, 2017.  
 42 
 
TIEZZI, SHANNON. (2014) The New Silk Road: China's Marshall Plan?. The Diplomat. 6th 
November 2014. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-new-silk-road-
chinas-marshall-plan/ [Accessed the 8th April 2018] 
XINHUA. (2013). “习近平在周边外交工作座谈会上发表重要讲话 [Xi Jinping’s Important 
Speech at the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference]", Xinhua News Agency, 25 
October 2013. Accessible at  http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-
10/25/c_117878897.htm. [Accessed the 19th of November] 
XINHUA. (2015). Silk Road Fund's 1st investment makes China's words into practice. 
Xinhua Net. 21st of April 2015. Accessible at: 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/21/c_134171060.htm> [Accessed the 
19th of November] 
XINHUA A (2017). Full text of President Xi's speech at opening of Belt and Road forum.  
14th of May 2017. Accessible at:  < http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
05/14/c_136282982.htm> [accessed the last time on 10/12/2017] 
XINHUA B. (2017). Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress. Xinhua 
Net, 3rd of November 2017. Accessible at: 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC
_National_Congress.pdf> [Accessed the last time 6th of May] 
ZHANG, HONGZHOU (2015).  Building the Silk Road Economic Belt: problems and 
priorities in Central Asia. Policy Report. May 2015., S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.  
ZHU RUIXUE, LIU XIULING, CAI LI. (2016). "Background and Strategic Significance of the 
“Belt and Road Initiative” of China." Journal of Behavioural Economics, Finance, 
Entrepreneurship, Accounting and Transport. 2016, Vol. 4, No. 3, 49-53. 
  
